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Abstract
Richard Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory
for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between cre-
dences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid;
its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local
Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
1 Introduction
Bradley (2000) shows that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate the following
natural Preservation condition on rational credences towards conditionals:1 roughly, that if A is
possibly true and C not possibly true, then the conditional pA → Cq is not possibly true. Pace
Bradley, who takes this result to be a problem for standard semantic approaches to the conditional,
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1A Boolean semantic theory is any semantic theory which assigns to sentences denotations which are elements of a
Boolean algebra; most theories of the conditional do just this, typically by identifying the denotations of conditionals
with the elements of a set algebra whose ur-elements are possible worlds. In subsequent work, Bradley defends a non-
Boolean semantics for conditionals that validates Preservation (Bradley, 2002). (Bradley (2012) defends a Boolean
aproach that validates Preservation restricted to a natural subset of probability functions, a move that in some ways
parallels our proposal concerning Local Preservation.) A broad range of other non-Boolean approaches designed to
validate The Thesis (discussed briefly below) also validate Preservation, which is a corollary of The Thesis; see e.g.
Adams 1975; Edgington 1995. See also Douven 2007; Rumfitt 2013 for other arguments against Preservation.
we argue that this preservation condition is invalid, and thus that this result poses no challenge to
standard semantic theories—and, conversely, that non-standard approaches which validate Preser-
vation are going in the wrong direction. We argue against Preservation first on the basis of intuitions
about natural language, which we suggest do not actually conform to the predictions of Preserva-
tion; and, second, on the grounds that Preservation on its own has absurd consequences which
should be unacceptable to any theorist of the conditional. We argue that one reason Preservation
may have seemed so plausible is that there is a nearby, but weaker, principle, which we argue is
valid; we call this principle Local Preservation. Local Preservation requires only that, for each
context, the proposition expressed by pA → Cq at that context obeys the Preservation condition
for the probability measure determined by that context. Boolean semantic theories of condition-
als have no problem validating Local Preservation; indeed, we show that one prominent semantic
theory, namely that given in Stalnaker 1968, 1975, does just that.
2 Bradley’s result
Bradley’s argument is simple and striking. We follow Bradley in using capital italics to range
over “factual” sentences (sentences that do not contain modals or conditionals), and, like him, we
restrict our attention to conditionals with factual sentences as antecedents and consequents. Let
‘→’ abbreviate the indicative conditional ‘If. . . then. . . ’. Let L be a set of sentences and P any
probability measure on L, meant to correspond to an agent’s credence function.2 Then for factual
sentences A and C such that {A,C, pA→ Cq} ⊆ L, we define the following constraint on P :
Preservation: If P (A) > 0 and P (C) = 0, then P (pA→ Cq) = 0.
2We follow Bradley here in taking probability measures to be defined over sentences; we assume that the set of
sentences meets appropriate formal constraints, i.e. is a σ-algebra. Later we will take the more standard approach of
treating probability measures as defined over propositions rather than sentences. Bradley states his result in a more
general fashion, letting P fail to be a probability measure provided it still meets certain formal conditions; we present a
slightly simplified version which is weaker in ways irrelevant for our purposes. Since Bradley formulates Preservation in
terms of sentences, rather than contents (or sentences relative to contexts), we assume that he is restricting his attention
to sentences without context-sensitive terms (notwithstanding his use of pronouns in example sentences, which we
will follow here). We can easily restate Preservation in terms of contents as follows: for all contexts c and probability
measures P , if P makes the content of A at c greater than 0 and the content of C at c equal to 0, then it must make the
content of pA→ Cq at c equal to 0.
Preservation is prima facie a very plausible constraint on rational credence functions. Bradley
motivates it like this:
You cannot. . . hold that we might go to the beach, but that we certainly won’t go
swimming and at the same time consider it possible that if we go to the beach we will
go swimming! To do so would reveal a misunderstanding of the indicative conditional
(or just plain inconsistency). (Bradley, 2000, 220)
Semantically ascending: if you have non-zero credence in ‘We go to the beach’ and zero credence
in ‘We will go swimming’, it seems incoherent to have non-zero credence in ‘If we go to the beach,
we will go swimming’. At first blush, this seems obviously right; certainly it would offend common
sense if you said: ‘There’s a chance that we’ll go to the beach today; there’s no chance that we’ll
swim there; and yet there’s a chance that we’ll go swimming if we go to the beach’.
But Bradley observes that there is no non-trivial language L and Boolean semantic theory for
indicative conditionals such that Preservation is guaranteed to hold for all sentences in L relative to
all probability measures over L. By “non-trivial language,” Bradley means a language L together
with an entailment relation over L such that there are factual sentences A,C ∈ L such that pA →
Cq ∈ L and neither A nor pA→ Cq entails C. Any plausible logic of natural language will be
non-trivial in this sense. Now let L be a set of sentences closed under conjunction, disjunction,
and negation, and partially ordered by an entailment relation `. Assume that Preservation holds
for all probability measures on L. Then L is trivial. For if L contains factual sentences A and
C and conditional pA → Cq, with A 0 C and pA → Cq 0 C, then there exists a probability
measure P on L such that P (A) > 0, P (C) = 0, and P (pA→ Cq) 6= 0, contrary to Preservation
(intuitively, this is because only entailment can force every probability measure to assign at least as
great probability to one sentence as to another). Thus there is no way to give a Boolean semantics
for the indicative conditional which guarantees that Preservation holds for all probability functions
on that language. In other words, there is no way to encode Preservation in the meaning of the
indicative conditional if we are working in a Boolean semantic framework.
3 A counterexample
Preservation is prima facie plausible, and in light of Bradley’s observation that it cannot be non-
trivially validated by any Boolean semantic theory of the conditional, it may seem that we have a
deep problem for any Boolean semantic theory of the conditional; this, in any case, is Bradley’s
interpretation. But, on closer examination, we think Preservation is in fact invalid. We begin our
argument for this conclusion by offering an intuitive counterexample to Preservation.
To have a counterexample to Preservation, we need a sentence of the form pA → Bq, with
A and B factual, such that it is rational to have non-zero credence in A and pA → Bq and zero
credence in B. Here is a case which seems to have just that property:
Fundraiser: It is Thursday night at the company fundraiser. 100 scratch card tickets
are being sold; 99 of the tickets grant the ticket-holder Friday off, while one is worth-
less. Ginger arrives at the fundraiser late, and there is only one ticket left to purchase.
Mark and Jim know all this, and they are wondering whether Ginger will buy the last
ticket and whether she will win (i.e., get permission to take Friday off). They know
that Ginger would take Friday off if she won. But they also know that the tickets are
expensive and so Ginger probably won’t buy the last ticket. Jim makes a prediction,
saying:
(1) If Ginger buys the last ticket, she will win.
Mark thinks about Jim’s claim. Since Mark knows that almost all of the tickets are
winning tickets, he concludes that what Jim says is very likely, but not certainly, true.
On Friday, Jim and Mark see that Ginger is at work. They now know that it’s not the
case that Ginger bought the ticket and won. Two possibilities remain open: (i) Ginger
bought the ticket and lost; and (ii) Ginger didn’t buy the ticket. Since Mark knows that
almost all of the tickets were winners, and since he thought from the start that it was
unlikely Ginger would buy a ticket, he thinks it is much more likely that Ginger simply
declined to buy the ticket than that she bought it and lost.
Given what Mark has learned, we now ask: should Mark now think that Jim’s claim that (1) is
certainly false? We think the answer to this question is no: in fact, there is good reason to think that
Mark should be slightly less confident in Jim’s claim, but overall still confident that it is true. If our
answer here is correct, then this provides a counterexample to Preservation: Mark may rationally
have non-zero credence in the claim that Ginger bought the last ticket, zero credence in the claim
that Ginger won the fundraiser, and non-zero credence in Jim’s claim in (1).
This is our intuitive judgment about the case, anyways, and the judgment of others we have
run the case by. We offer two arguments to bolster this judgment. First, intuitively, the probability
of Jim’s claim is the same as the probability that the final remaining ticket is a winning ticket,
since Jim’s claim—that Ginger will win if she buys the last ticket—is, in this context, intuitively
equivalent to the claim that the final ticket is a winner. Mark has learned nothing over the course
of the scenario that suggests that these probabilities should in fact diverge. And, although Mark’s
credence that the last ticket is a winner should go down slightly upon learning that the Ginger did
not in fact win, he should still think it is overwhelmingly likely that the final ticket is a winner
(in the Appendix, we argue for this by assigning numerical probabilities to the relevant claims and
showing that this conclusion follows in the probability calculus). So, he should continue to think
that Jim’s claim is very likely true.
The second argument comes from considerations about foresight and updating. Before Mark
learns that Ginger didn’t win, it seems that he should think that Jim’s claim—that if Ginger buys
the last ticket, she will win—is likely true. Now, suppose at this point he is asked, ‘But what if
Ginger doesn’t win?’ It seems that Mark should reason as follows: ‘In fact, I think it is pretty likely
that Ginger won’t win, since I think it’s quite likely that Ginger won’t buy a ticket at all. So, I still
think Jim’s claim is likely to be true, given that Ginger doesn’t win. Thus, I would stand by my
judgment that Jim’s claim is likely true, even if I learned that Ginger didn’t win.’ On Friday, when
Mark learns that Ginger didn’t win, he should then just update his credences according to these
commitments, and thus continue to believe that Jim’s claim is likely.3
4 A triviality result
In this section we provide our second argument against Preservation: not only does Preservation
face counterexamples like the one just sketched, but adopting it on its own—whether in a standard
Boolean semantic framework or not—leads to absurd results.
Bradley’s Preservation principle is a corollary of a well-known claim about the probabilities
of conditionals, namely that the probability of a conditional equals the corresponding conditional
probability of its consequent given its antecedent:4
The Thesis: P (pA→ Cq) = P (C|A), if P (A) > 0.
It is easy to see that Preservation follows immediately from The Thesis. However, it is now known,
on the basis of both triviality results and intuitive counterexamples, that The Thesis does not hold
in full generality.5 It is worth noting that, since Preservation is a corollary of The Thesis, our
counterexample to Preservation is also a further counterexample to The Thesis.
More pertinent for present purposes, however, is the question of whether the triviality results
which showed that The Thesis cannot hold in full generality can be adapted to show the same for
3Yet another argument comes from hindsight judgments. Suppose that, after learning Ginger didn’t win, Mark is
asked whether he stands by his earlier claim. It seems perfectly reasonable for Mark to respond: ‘Yes, I still think Jim’s
claim is likely’. He might go on: ‘Before I learned that Ginger didn’t win, it was likely that if Ginger had bought the last
ticket, she would have won; and this is still likely, since it is still likely that the last ticket was a winning ticket.’ One
corollary of this point is that Preservation does not hold for counterfactuals (nor does the Local Preservation principle
we propose below). Some have argued that, when it comes to ‘will’-conditionals, the indicative/counterfactual distinction
does not clearly obtain, and thus one might think that, given that there are independent reasons to think that Preservation
does not hold for counterfactuals, our example could be dismissed by arguing that (1) is not an indicative conditional at
all. But note that we can set up an identical case with a past-oriented version of (1), by having Jim say ‘If Ginger bought
the last ticket, she won’ after the fundraiser is over, but before they come into work the next morning and discover Ginger
didn’t win. Intuitions about this variant, which is uncontroversially indicative, seem to pattern with our original case.
Thanks to Richard Bradley and Paolo Santorio for helpful discussion on these points.
4P (C|A) is the conditional probability of C given A. For our purposes, we will define this in the standard way as
follows: P (C|A) =def P (AC)P (A) , if P (A) > 0.
5Something like The Thesis was first defended in Ramsey (1931), and has been extensively discussed in e.g. Stalnaker
(1970); Adams (1975); Edgington (1995); Douven (2013). Lewis (1976) is responsible for the first in a long series
of results showing that adopting The Thesis in full generality leads to triviality; see McGee 2000; Kaufmann 2004;
Rothschild 2013 for some apparent counterexamples to The Thesis.
Preservation. This is a substantive question, since Preservation is strictly weaker than The Thesis,
and so formal arguments which show that the latter holds in general only in trivial cases do not
necessarily show the same of the former. But it turns out that we can indeed adapt those arguments
to Preservation. Here is one such argument, building on Lewis (1976)’s result. By the law of total
probability, we know the following to be true for any A and C, assuming P (C) and P (C) are both
non-zero:
P (pA→ Cq) = P (pA→ Cq|C) · P (C) + P (pA→ Cq|C) · P (C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
Suppose further that Preservation is valid, i.e. holds for all probability functions over our lan-
guage. Then, since P (·|C) will be a probability function, it will satisfy Preservation. Assume
that P (A|C) > 0. Then, since (by the probability calculus) P (C|C) = 0, by Preservation,
P (pA → Cq|C) will have to be 0; so the right-hand term x in the equation above is 0. Then
we get P (pA → Cq) = P (pA → Cq|C) · P (C) = P ((pA → C) ∧ Cq). Thus if Preserva-
tion holds in general, then, whenever your initial credence in a conditional’s consequent and the
consequent’s negation are both non-zero, and the probability of the conditional’s antecedent will
remain non-zero if you learn the negation of the consequent, you must hold that the probability of
the conditional as a whole is equal to the probability of the conjunction of the conditional and its
consequent.
But this is absurd. For instance, in Fundraiser it is clear that, before Ginger decides whether
to buy the ticket, you should think the probability of (1) is high, since the final ticket is likely a
winner. But the conjunction of (1) with its consequent is much less probable, since you think it is
quite unlikely Ginger will buy a ticket at all. Moreover, your prior credences in the consequent (that
Ginger will win) and its negation are non-zero, and your credence in the conditional’s antecedent
(that Ginger buys the ticket) will remain non-zero if you learn the negation of the consequent (that
she didn’t win).
Not only is this corollary absurd, but it also leads to a kind of triviality very much like the
kind Bradley himself identifies, as an anonymous referee for this journal helpfully points out to
us. By the probability calculus, P (p(A → C) ∧ Cq) = P (pA → Cq) · P (C|pA → Cq). So
then if P (p(A → C) ∧ Cq) = P (pA → Cq), it follows that P (C|pA → Cq) = 1: in other
words, if we come to learn pA→ Cq, we must thereby come to learn C! This is another obviously
absurd corollary of Preservation. And not only is this result obviously false, it in fact shows that
Preservation on its own comes very close to rendering our language trivial in Bradley’s own sense.6
Note that the present result is very different from Bradley’s triviality result. Bradley’s triviality
results showed that the combination of Preservation with the assumption that conditionals have a
Boolean semantics leads to triviality. Bradley’s result could thus be taken to tell against Boolean
approaches to the semantics of conditionals (as Bradley took it) or against Preservation. By con-
trast, the present considerations show that Preservation on its own, given basic features of the
probability calculus, leads to absurd consequences, and indeed nearly to triviality in Bradley’s own
sense. This means that we should not respond to this result by validating Preservation and rejecting
the assumption that conditionals have a Boolean semantics: rather, the present considerations show
that Preservation itself cannot be valid.7
6It doesn’t quite render the language trivial in Bradley’s sense—which would require that A or pA → Cq always
entails C—since our result only holds when P (A|C) > 0 and P (C) > 0; and, in infinite models, P (C|pA → Cq)
can be 1 without pA → Cq entailing C, for reasons having to do with regularity. But we can formulate this result
as rendering our language trivial in a manner which is the natural probabilistic parallel to Bradley’s notion: as long
as P (C) > 0, P (C) > 0, and P (A) > 0, we have that P (C|A) = 1 or P (C|pA → Cq) = 1, i.e. that C is
probabilistically guaranteed by either A or by pA→ Cq.
7Another, more radical, response, in line with the non-propositional tradition in the theory of conditionals (e.g. Adams
1975; Edgington 1995; Bennett 2003), would be to argue that the probability calculus is not an appropriate model for
rational credence towards conditionals, and in particular that the law of total probability does not hold for conditionals.
On this view, strictly speaking, conditionals do not have classical probabilities at all (as Lewis (1976) points out). We
are not very sympathetic to this response. First, we don’t see the motivation to give up the probability calculus in order
to hold onto a principle which, in light of the evidence given in the last section, is not intuitively valid. Second, it is
hard to see how this response can make sense of a variety of natural judgments about conditionals. In particular, it is not
obvious how it could explain comparative probability judgments between conditionals and non-conditionals, such as:
(i) It’s more likely that the die landed on an odd than that it landed on an even if it landed on a prime.
Thanks to Ian Rumfitt and Paolo Santorio for helpful discussion on these issues.
5 Local Preservation
On the basis of these considerations, we conclude that Preservation is in fact invalid. This deprives
Bradley’s result of its revisionary force. His result shows that no non-trivial Boolean semantic
theory for the conditional can guarantee Preservation. But this turns out to be all to the good for
standard truth-conditional approaches to the conditional: Preservation is invalid, and so our theory
of conditionals had better not validate it.
This, however, leaves something unexplained: why did Preservation seem so plausible in the
first place? On reflection, there is something special about our counter-example to Preservation: it
involves the evaluation of a conditional asserted at a different time, in light of different information,
than at the time of evaluation. Indeed, all the counterexamples to Preservation which we have been
able to construct have just this form.
We propose to make sense of this situation by holding that the reason that Preservation seemed
so plausible at first sight is because a different principle in the neighborhood is in fact valid. In or-
der to state the principle, we will switch from thinking about probability measures over sentences
to probability measures over contents, which for our purposes we can treat as possible-worlds
propositions; where A is a sentence, [[A]]c is the proposition A expresses relative to a context c,
where a context is a centered world (a triple of a world, time, and location). The same sentence
can express different contents in different contexts. This shift in formalism allows us to distinguish
Preservation from a different principle which we call Local Preservation, and which, by contrast to
Preservation, we maintain is valid. Given a context c, let Pc be the probability measure associated
with the context: the probability measure which represents in some way what is commonly ac-
cepted in that context, and thus which assigns non-zero measure to all and only the elements of the
context’s common ground.8 We hold that the correct principle in the neighborhood of Preservation
is the following limited principle:
8This will not be plausible in the infinite case for reasons having to do with regularity, so we restrict attention to cases
where the common ground is finite. Plausibly there are many probability measures associated with a given context, but
it is obvious how to generalize this condition to that case, so we stick with a uniqueness assumption for simplicity.
Local Preservation: If Pc([[A]]c) > 0 and Pc([[B]]c) = 0, then Pc([[pA→ Bq]]c) = 0.
This states, essentially, that Preservation always holds as viewed from the context of assertion,
but leaves it open that it fails as viewed from other contexts. In other words, whenever someone
asserts pA→ Bq in a given context c, then, if the probability function associated with that context
makes the content of the antecedent greater than zero and the content of the consequent zero, it
must make the content of the conditional zero. But Local Preservation says nothing about how we
must evaluate conditionals in different contexts from those in which they are asserted; in particular,
it leaves it open that we sometimes assign non-zero credence to the content of the antecedent of
a conditional, zero credence to the content of the consequent of the conditional, and non-zero
credence to the content of the whole conditional, provided we are doing so from the perspective of
a different context than the context of assertion.
We thus believe that Local Preservation makes good sense of the intuitions used to motivate
Preservation, while remaining consistent with the counterexample to Preservation provided above:
Preservation is always valid when we are thinking about a conditional in the same context in which
it was asserted; it is not always valid when we are thinking about a conditional from a different
context.
6 Validating Local Preservation
At this point, the essential question to ask is whether Bradley’s triviality result can be generalized
to show that only trivial languages can validate Local Preservation, in which case we would not
have done much to vindicate truth-conditional approaches to the conditional.
Fortunately, it cannot. Bradley’s result follows from the fact that, when A fails to entail B,
there is a probability function which assigns A non-zero value and B zero, which entails that there
is no non-trivial Boolean semantic theory for the conditional which validates Preservation. But
there is no problem validating Local Preservation; to do this, we need only ensure that the content
that a conditional expresses in a given context is connected in a suitable way to the probability
measure associated with that context. And this is straightforward to do. In fact, one of the leading
theories of indicative conditionals already does just this, namely the theory of Stalnaker 1968, 1975.
Stalnaker’s theory runs as follows. Let fc(ϕ,w) be a selection function provided by the context c
which takes a proposition ϕ and world w to a ϕ-world w′ (intuitively, the closest ϕ-world to w),
with fc meeting the following conditions, for all contexts and all propositions ϕ,ψ and worlds w
(CGc is the common ground of c—the set of worlds compatible with the common assumptions in
the conversation):9
(i) Success: fc(ϕ,w) ∈ ϕ.
(ii) CSO: If fc(ϕ,w) ∈ ψ and fc(ψ,w) ∈ ϕ, then fc(ϕ,w) = fc(ψ,w).
(iii) Strong Centering: If w ∈ ϕ, then fc(ϕ,w) = w.
(iv) Indicative Constraint: If CGc ∩ ϕ 6= ∅ and w ∈ CGc, then fc(ϕ,w) ∈ CGc.
Then we say that an indicative conditional pA → Cq, asserted at c, expresses the proposition
{w : fc([[A]]c, w) ∈ [[C]]c}: in other words, pA→ Cq is true at a world just in case the closest [[A]]c-
world is a [[C]]c-world. (Note that Indicative Constraint only applies to indicative conditionals. This
is crucial, since this constraint is essential to ensuring that Local Preservation is valid for indicative
conditionals; whereas Local Preservation is not valid for counterfactuals, for the reasons noted in
Footnote 3.)
These conditions suffice to validate Local Preservation. SupposePc([[A]]c) > 0 andPc([[C]]c) =
0. Then it follows (from the assumption that Pc assigns non-zero measure to all and only the el-
ements of CGc) that [[A]]c ∩ CGc 6= ∅, and thus that the closest [[A]]c-world to any world in CGc
will also be in CGc (by Indicative Constraint); since Pc([[C]]c) = 0, there are no [[C]]c-worlds in
CGc (again, by our assumption about the relation between Pc and CGc), and thus for any world
9The ‘if. . . then. . . ’ in these conditions is intended to be interpreted as the material conditional. We include an absurd
world λ which makes every sentence true so that Success can be satisfied even when ϕ is inconsistent, and stipulate that
fc(ϕ,w) = λ only if ϕ is inconsistent.
in the common ground, the closest [[A]]c-world to that world cannot be a [[C]]c-world; thus by our
truth-conditions, pA→ Cq will be false at every world in CGc, and thus Pc([[pA→ Cq]]c) = 0.
Moreover, this theory of the conditional is non-trivial, in Bradley’s sense. To show this it
suffices to construct a partial model of Stalnaker’s semantics which is non-trivial. Let CGc =
{w,w′, w′′} with w ∈ [[A ∧ ¬C]]c, w′ ∈ [[A ∧ C]]c, and w′′ ∈ [[¬A ∧ ¬C]]c. Let fc([[A]]c, w′′) =
w′. Let entailment be the subset relation. Then [[A]]c fails to entail [[C]]c (since the former is true at
w and the latter is not); and [[pA→ Cq]]c fails to entail [[C]]c (since the former is true at w′′ and the
latter is not). Thus there are non-trivial truth-conditional theories of the conditional which validate
Local Preservation; and Stalnaker’s is one of them.
Furthermore, it is clear that Local Preservation does not lead to the absurd result discussed in
§4: to obtain that result, we had to assume that Preservation held not only for a starting probability
measure, but also for the probability measure which resulted from conditionalizing on a certain
content; but this does not follow from Local Preservation.
We conclude this discussion by working through the Fundraiser case to show in more detail
how this semantics predicts exceptions to Preservation, even while validating Local Preservation.
We’ll make one key assumption about the selection function made salient by the initial context in
Fundraiser, namely that, for any A and w, the closest [[A]]c-world from w will agree with w on
whether the last ticket inw is a winner (whenever this is possible given the constraints above). Now
consider again (1), which we’ll abbreviate pB →Wq:
(1) If Ginger buys the last ticket, she will win.
According to our semantics, in its initial context of assertion c1, (1) expresses the propositionJpB → WqKc1= {w : fc1(JBKc1 , w) ∈ JW Kc1}. This proposition is true at any world where the
last ticket is a winner and Ginger buys the ticket (by Strong Centering). At any world where the last
ticket is a winner and Ginger doesn’t buy the ticket, given our assumption that the selected world
matches the ticket status whenever possible, the closest world where Ginger does buy the ticket is
one where she wins (note that the common ground of c1 still contains worlds in which Ginger wins,
so this doesn’t violate Indicative Constraint), and so the conditional is true. By Strong Centering,
the conditional is false at any world where the last ticket is a loser and Ginger buys it; and, by our
assumption about the selection function, the conditional is likewise false at any world where the
last ticket is a loser and Ginger doesn’t buy it. So—in accord with the intuitions we elicited at the
outset—(1), as asserted in its original context, expresses the same proposition as ‘The last ticket is
a winner’ expresses.
This is helpful to see for two reasons. First, this shows that our theory matches the intuitions
elicited in our discussion of (1) at the outset, where we noted that these are intuitively equivalent in
the context in question. Second, it helps explain what happens when, from the posterior context c2
(in which we have learned that Ginger did not win), we evaluate what (1) expressed in context c1.
Intuitively, we should still assign non-zero credence to this content—in violation of Preservation—
because, in the posterior context, we still assign non-zero credence to the proposition that the last
ticket was a winner, which we have just shown is the same proposition as JpB →WqKc1 .
By contrast, things are different if we consider, from c2, not the content which (1) expressed
as asserted in c1, but rather the content which the corresponding past conditional (2) expresses as
asserted in c2:
(2) If Ginger bought the last ticket, she won.
Since we validate Local Preservation, (2), as asserted in this posterior context, has zero probability.
We have already shown that this is true in general. In this case, this follows because there are no
worlds in the common ground of c2 where the last ticket is a winner and Ginger bought it; there
are only worlds where (a) the ticket was a loser or (b) the ticket was a winner and Ginger didn’t
buy it. In (a)-worlds, (2) will be false for the same reasons as in the initial context. But what about
in (b)-worlds? In those worlds, in the initial context, we said that the closest world where Ginger
did buy the ticket was one where the status of the ticket remained the same, and thus where she
won; and so that the conditional was true at those worlds. But, thanks to Indicative Constraint, this
does not hold for (2) (as uttered in c2) since there are no worlds in the common ground of c2 where
Ginger bought the ticket and won. Instead, the selection function must, by Indicative Constraint
plus Success, take any (b)-world to an (a)-world where Ginger bought the ticket—and thus lost. So,
as uttered in c2, (2) expresses a proposition which is false throughout the common ground of c2.
This discussion brings out the crucial role of Indicative Constraint in validating Local Preser-
vation. Indicative Constraint ensures that, when we get new information, what proposition a given
conditional expresses can change. This ensures that if we have zero credence in the consequent
and non-zero credence in the antecedent in that context, we will have zero credence in what the
conditional expresses in that context; even though we may still have non-zero credence in what the
conditional expressed in a different context.
7 Conclusion
Bradley’s Preservation condition looks universally valid at first sight. But the example we have
given, and the absurd corollary we have pointed to, show that it is only valid in a limited case: when
we are considering a conditional in the context in which it is asserted. And, while no non-trivial
Boolean theory of the conditional validates Preservation, there are non-trivial Boolean theories,
like Stalnaker’s, which validate Local Preservation. Pace Bradley and some of his followers, con-
siderations about Preservation thus do not tell against Boolean approaches to the conditional. On
the contrary, they tell against any theory which validates Preservation full stop, and in favor of any
theory (including Boolean approaches like Stalnaker’s) which invalidates Preservation in general
but still validates Local Preservation.10
Appendix
Here we add numerical probabilities to Fundraiser. Let:
• T = ‘The last ticket is a winning ticket’
10Many thanks to an anonymous editor and referee for this journal, and to Richard Bradley, Ian Rumfitt, and Paolo
Santorio for very helpful comments.
• B = ‘Ginger buys a ticket’
• W = ‘Ginger wins’
Mark’s credences, prior to learning that Ginger did not win, are given by the function P :
• P (B) = 0.1, since Mark thinks it unlikely that Ginger will buy a ticket; and since the
likelihood of winning is independent of buying, we have: P (B) = P (B|T ) = P (B|T ) =
0.1
• P (T ) = 0.99
• P (T ) = 1− P (T ) = 0.01
• P (pB →Wq) = P (T ) = 0.99, since these are intuitively equivalent.
We can now calculate Mark’s conditional probability that the last ticket was a winning ticket, given
that Ginger didn’t win (calculation below, rounding to three decimal places):
• P (T |W ) = 0.989
Assuming that Mark’s credence that Ginger wins if she buys the ticket remains equivalent to his
credence that the final ticket is a winning ticket, Mark’s posterior credence that Ginger wins if she
buys a ticket should thus be 0.989.
Calculation: P (T |W ) = P (T |WB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
·P (B|W ) + P (T |WB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.99
·P (B|W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.999
= 0.989
• P (T |WB) = 0.99 because learning that Ginger did not buy a ticket (and hence did not win)
should not impact how likely you think that the final ticket was a winning ticket.
• P (B|W ) = P (W |B) · P (B)
P (W )
=
1 · P (B)
P (W )
=
1 · 0.9
0.901
= 0.999
• P (W ) = P (W |B) · P (B) + P (W |B) · P (B)
= P (T ) · P (B) + 1 · P (B)
= 0.01 · 0.1 + 1 · 0.9 = 0.901
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